Ethical Security Solutions

Saturday 22 July 2017

US Airport security and Measurable improvements since 9.11.2001

Measurable improvements since 9.11.2001

   Measurable improvements in airport security and their effectiveness
   Has the current airport security measures have any measurable improvement since September 11, 2001? Yes and NO.  It is hard to come up with a definitive answer of measurability given the fact that it is hard to actually measure the results that are reported to security personnel, law enforcement by a researcher as well as the fact that these reports are not made public to the media. Given the fact that not all security-related events are being reported to the public, we do not have all the facts. Thus, we cannot get a full picture of how deep any security breaches or successes security actions were. 
    In addition, we cannot know if any security measures that have been implemented prior event or post-event had any deterring effects on actual terrorists and criminals, given that no self-reporting or another survey of terrorists or criminals have been conducted.  And so, with this reality, we can only assume the measurability, and not have a full complete definitive answer.
   Airport security regulations are different from state to state, and for the most part, much of the TSA airport security is “security threat”. In many airports, one can witness police holding submachine rifles, police riding around in droves on electric-powered scooters, drug, and bomb-sniffing dog units all over the place makes one feel that they are secure, when in fact it is an act of theatrics giving the perception of effective security (Levenson, 2014).
  How does one scientifically study airport security effectiveness, and if any current security measures implemented have had any impact on safety and security? What do we compare it too? Pre 9-11? Has this heightened security mode prevented another 9-11 style aircraft take over? One can only assume? However, we don’t truly know if it did prevent another 9-11, and how? If terrorists did, in fact, chose not to do another 9-11 terrorist act, we cannot know. Did terrorists themselves changed tactics and targets choosing instead not to make a copycat airliner take over, we simply cannot know this with certainty.
   All airports security directors and TSA agents can do are react to a the terrorist event, and what terrorists try to do next. An example of this reactionary method is when the 9-11 terrorist hijacked aircraft using blades of some sort and as a reactionary measure, security made everyone dump their nail cutters as well as other items that have sharp edges. Another example is the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, who tried to light a bomb within his shoe, and this reactionary mode thinking made TSA take everyone’s shoe off for inspection. 

   Airlines security is a reactionary system built off a law enforcement model of after the fact investigation versus true security, which should be a prevention philosophy. This prevention thinking is done through risk management and developing a system to counter the attack. And so, we have today what is dubbed “Security Theater” something that looks like security but is not (Levenson, 2014).  This “security theater” mode just shows that the prevention method is yet to be mastered.

    However; with all that said, we can assume that security has gotten better given what has been done so far, and we can only speculate the impact of terrorism has nothing been done.    On the flip side, if we take things from a terrorist’s point of view, we can also say that terrorism works. Terrorism works due to the fact that now more money and resources must be put into the air travel industry. In addition, freedoms have been lost by American citizens and an airline screening turned into a prison model of security. From this point of view, terrorism has in fact worked! 

   How did terrorism work? Simply by making travelers and governments fearful, thereby governments are now putting valuable resources into security, chasing ghosts, and investigating rumors. Security may have improved but at a cost of civil liberties and profit.

   Medias report on airport screeners and security
    With all the money and resources were thrown into improving security at airports, one can read from diverse sources that TSA screeners continually fail tests in detecting explosives and weapons, as well as many other failures when it comes to screening for contraband (Bradner, 2015).
    The investment into security screeners runs into the millions per year, yet they fail time and time again, thereby squandering taxpayer money when it comes to the return on investment.     In one popular case, it has been reported that the homeland security will be reassigning an administrator due to the fact that after testing the airport security with 70 tests, 67 screening processes failed. This means that banned items got through 95 percent time as was reported by internal investigators (Fishel, 2015). This is obviously a major failure of the system, with a high and unacceptable 95 percent failure rate.
     In addition to major failures in the security screening system, the TSA is basically a stage for what is dubbed as “Security Theater”. Security Theater is defined as security measures that are intended to provide a feeling or the illusion of improved security while doing little to nothing to actually improve security (Yourdictionary, 2014).
     In addition to TSA security staff posing to give a “feeling” of security, police officers are staged as armed characters with submachine guns pacing around the airport theater as heightened security, once again posturing as effective vigilant security. For this police unit to actually run into a terrorist doing an active shooting event by such theatrically placed police, is statistically small to none. But this theater gives the public the illusion of effective security (Bradner, 2015).
     A few other examples of security theater that does little to actually improve security but give an image of security, are the ever so invasive security pat-downs of infants, elderly and sickly as though these three categories would somehow be suicide bombers or armed felons. What is the logic of patting down an infant? These invasive pat-downs are a TSA security theater, and this is its main purpose, to give an image of security.
    It is also reported by TSA agents, that body scans are not effective due to the fact they can be manipulated. By the manipulation of these scanning machines, they will sound false positives or no reading at all. Therefore the screening machines are not a reliable tool to fight against weapons hidden as concluded by TSA security scanner instructors. It is reported by TSA sources once again in 2015, that the purpose of all these actions of heightened security measures, is to give the perception of security at nearly all airports, thereby giving a false sense of security.
     In addition, coming to light in past reports, was the instances where an undercover investigation was conducted and found that 67 out of 70 test with a red team failed. This translates to a 95 percent failure rate by the investigating team (Fishel, 2015). This is a gross neglect and violation of good security and ethics of trust. How can such failure rates go unpunished? In some cases, there have been punishments handed out, not only to staff but also to administrators. With such a high failure rate, what justifies all the security staff budgets and expenses?
     What justifies the purchasing of high technology scanning machines? What justifies the long lines? How is this justified to the public? These are just a few of the questions asked by Congress and the public.
    Statistics and the overall picture about airport screeners
    According to reports by the Homeland Security department, a third of the security employees employed by TSA, resign within their first 12 months of employment. According to Homeland security Chief Johnson, low employee morale, as well as a high number of employees leaving their jobs, has caused many difficulties for travelers. Chief Johnson also testified before congress, that the TSA had a problem with retaining security screeners; it has been reported that TSA has 5000 fewer security screeners today, as compared years past (Abdullah, 2016).
     It was also reported that about 117 security screeners leave the job every week. This is about 35 percent per year, which translates to over 6000 security staff per year. With so many security staff leaving the job, it was testified before Congress that TSA is having a 10 percent attrition rate and that TSA sees no solution to this and other such challenges (Abdullah, 2016).
     The turnover reported before congress is not only security officers walking off the job because of job dissatisfaction in general, but also, but also to officers being fired for crimes such as theft and other crimes.
     Customers claiming missing luggage and missing valuables, after leaving the luggage screening machines between 2010 and 2014, with a whopping number of 30,621 prompted an investigation. The total property loss claims came to roughly 2.5 million US dollars. In 2002 for example, the TSA fired 513 security staff for theft, contributing to the high rate of turnover (Zamost, 2015).
    Since the undercover investigation of 2015 that exposed a 95 percent failure rate, the TSA has started to standardize its security staff training, with this training program development, the TSA is hoping for an improvement in how security screeners do their job. To address these deficiencies, they started the TSA training academy to utilize classroom and field training for security agents to learn their new standardized skills. The academy also will help to improve morale and turnover by improving and implementing a sense of professionalism, pride, as well as better pay to the agents working for TSA (CBS News, 2016).

Improvements, measures to implemented to reduce costs and effective solutions

   Offered or possible solutions
    One area of security-related improvement in the TSA comes is in the way of manpower, technology, equipment, and an actual TSA academy to train the workers. However, the fact it took over a decade to start such TSA academy, witnesses to the chaos within this homeland security TSA scheme. Yes, there have been failures, but it takes time to fix failure as one learns, grows, and develops.

   It is without a doubt that the airline security screeners have been a failure since its inception, but with the development of a TSA academy, there is still hope. The TSA was a knee jerk reaction to the events of 9-11, and thus it was a political answer to a more complicated security-related problem.
   It is hoped that if a security culture mindset becomes the forefront of TSA security, it has a good chance of developing into something good. And by “if”, I mean politics, profit, and industrial complex such as the war industrial complex stays out of it. If one puts money and profits as well as corporate interests before security, true security is doomed to fail and will continue to be security theater as we have today.
   When it comes to cost-saving measures in the context of long term planning, I would invest in people, and the start of the TSA academy is a positive step towards that direction. This I believe is a very positive step towards reaching this goal of real security versus Security Theater. By retaining a professional and well-trained staff, will lead to a much happier staff that can take pride in the fact that what they are doing will benefit their society when it comes to flight transportation security and safety.

   Training and administrative costs to replace and train new screeners to replace those that have quit will be immense, given the fact that replacement always costs more than retention.
    Since manpower generates the greatest costs, one should invest to stop the leaks, and find a way to retain the manpower investment, and this investment of course is going to be tested in time, TSA is a work in progress.

     It is obvious to the observer and researcher that TSA security screenings are a hassle, and it seems that more problems have resulted versus stopped by TSA. High turnover, wasted resources, bad training, long lines, and low job satisfaction have all contributed to a mess within the TSA security system. However, like all things brought about due to a changing world, there will always be a problem when new programs are implemented. But over time, these problems will be smoothed out, and we can witness this by the start of the TSA academy and the standardization of the security infrastructure.
   Politics, bad administration, and wasted resources are more to blame for current and past failed progress within the TSA. Over time the kinks in the system with its administration will be worked out, or they will simply be replaced by a private security force as was the case prior to 9-11. I believe there is hope for this security infrastructure, and throwing out the baby with the bathwater is not the solution. Like the Israelis, a security culture must be adopted within society to assist in their own security at airports.

By Shamuel Kohen

Levenson, E.  (2014, January 11). The TSA is in the the business of “Security Theater,” not security.
    Retrieved from    security-theater-not-security/357599/
Bradner, E. (2015, June 2). Active TSA director reassigned after screeners failed tests to detect     explosives, weapon. Retrieved from    undercover-airport-screening-tests/
YourDictionary (December, 2016). Security-theater. Retrieved from
Fishel, J. (2015, June 1). Exclusive: Undercover DHS tests find security failures at US airports.     Retrieved from    widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881
Abdullah, H. (2016, May 13). TSA to frustrated travelers: Please pardon our progress this     summer. Retrieved from    security-line-waits-n573796
Zamost, S. (2015, September 15) Hidden cameras reveal airport workers stealing from luggage.     Retrieved from
CBS News. (2016, February 11) Behind the scenes of the TSA’s new training academy.     Retrieved from    checkpoint-screeners/